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LEADING THE WORLD IN THE WRONG DIRECTION:
IS IT TIME FOR THE UNITED STATES TO ADOPT THE
WORLD STANDARD “LOSER PAYS” RULE IN
CIVIL LITIGATION?

by
Victor D. López, J.D. *
Eugene T. Maccarrone, J.D., CPA**

I. INTRODUCTION
Although there has long been a debate in the United States as
to whether we are an overly litigious society1, it is fair to say that
the world largely views the United States as the most litigious
nation on earth. Not open to debate is the fact that there is a great
deal of litigation in the United States every year, and that the
number of United States civil litigations (5,806 cases filed per year
per 100,000 people) is much higher than in other countries
(compared, for example, to other major legal systems such as the
U.K. [3,681 cases per 100,000 people], Australia [1,542 cases filed
per 100,000 people] and Canada [1,450 cases filed per 100,000
people]).2
Concomitantly, it is not surprising that the United States has
more lawyers than any other country. Recent estimates show there
are more than 1.1 million lawyers in the United States, or one
lawyer per 270 residents.3 Direct comparisons to other countries is
difficult for a variety of reasons, including the fact that providers of legal
*
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services can include non-lawyers such as notaries who provide legal
services in many countries around the world. Nevertheless, by any
reasonable measure it is clear that both the amount of litigation and the
number of lawyers in the United States are robust.4

Similarly not surprising is that all of this litigation with all of
these lawyers come at substantial cost to litigants in the United
States. Costs of tort litigation alone in the United States have risen
from $1.8 billion in 1950 when it represented 0.62 percent of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to $148.1 billion in 2009 or 1.74
percent of GDP.5 Tort costs as a percentage of GDP are
significantly higher in the United States than in any other country
and have increased steadily from $1.8 billion (0.62% of GDP) in
1950 to $260.1 billion by 2004, (representing 2.22% of GDP for
that year).6 Unquestionably such legal costs have been increasing
significantly in the United States. The average annual increase in
tort costs from 1950-2004 is 9.6% while the average annual
increase in GDP for the same time period is 7.1%.7 As a ratio to
economic output, United States tort costs exceed those of other
industrialized countries by a sizable margin; with the exception of
Italy, which had a tort cost as a percentage of GDP of 1.7%
(compared to 2.2% for the United States), other countries have
recent tort costs relative to economic output comparable to those in
the United States in the 1960s and 1970s.8 Per capita tort costs in
the United States adjusted for inflation have risen by a factor of
nearly 10 from 1950 to 2004.9
There arguably exist many factors that combine to cause the
American explosion of litigation and its attendant costs. A major
contributing factor encouraging litigiousness and its resultant costs
in the United States is the continued use of the “American Rule” as
the general mechanism for assigning the payment of lawyers’ fees.
This rule, generally requiring each party to a litigation to bear that
party’s respective attorney’s costs, affords plaintiffs little risk in
pursuing law suits under the simple calculus that for limited and
often estimatable legal fees plaintiffs can instigate and pursue
lawsuits which may allow a significant payoff if they win, whereas
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defendants also must pay legal fees to minimize the risk of losing,
whether they are or are not legally in the wrong.
This approach is in contrast to the so-called “English Rule”
that requires the losing party in a civil law suit to reimburse the
winning party’s legal costs10 (this is really the “World Rule”
inasmuch as the rest of the world generally follows this rule, as
well as in that the “American Rule” is followed only in the United
States11; which also begs the question: Is the rest of the entire
world wrong?), Such a “loser pays” rule as otherwise used world
wide appears to have the advantage of eliminating the plaintiffs’
incentive for bring suits that may in fact be dubious.
This article examines the history and contemporary
application of the American Rule, with an eye toward assessing
whether American justice might better and more cost effectively
be served by a change to a “Loser Pays” system like that presently
used in England, and around the globe.
II. BRIEF
BACKGROUND
SHIFTING

ON

ATTORNEY-FEE

The “United States Rule” that each party to litigation should,
in the absence of a statute to the contrary, bear the cost of its own
legal costs is well ingrained in our system. The losing party in civil
litigation in federal courts is generally assessed court costs in both
trial and appellate cases.12 The state rules generally parallel the
federal rule with few exceptions.13
But this was not always the case in the United States.
Originally, colonial America adopted the English Rule and
allowed the prevailing party to collect attorney’s fees from the
losing party.14 In migrating to and then maintaining the American
Rule the most often cited rationale was enhancing access to
justice—a concern that a “loser pays” system may discourage
aggrieved parties from pursuing legal remedies in the courts out of
fear of having to pay not only their own attorney’s fees, but also
those of the defendant if they lose.15 Of note, however, is that
contrary to the oft stated rationale, the English Rule (again, more
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accurately the “World Rule”) was not adopted in the United States
after its independence from England because of any concern about
access to justice, but rather out of a desire by lawyers to not be
limited to the statutory compensation provided for under the old
statutes.16 The English Rule was abandoned along with the low
statutory limits on lawyer’s fees, effectively allowing lawyers to
charge higher fees but removing the requirement that the loser pay
both his/her attorney’s fees along with those of the prevailing party
in civil suits.17
The genesis of the American Rule as a means of maximizing
the profitability of a law practice is a useful fact to keep in mind
when evaluating the relative merits of the American Rule versus
the World Rule.
III. WHO BENEFITS FROM THE AMERICAN RULE?
In the debate over the relative merits of the American Rule
over the English/World Rule, access to justice is a primary
argument advanced for maintaining the status quo. If “loser pays”
is adopted, the argument goes, plaintiffs, in particular those of
limited means, will be dissuaded from asserting their rights in
court for fear of having to pay the potentially high attorneys’ fees
of the prevailing party.18 But commentators have also argued that
this American no-indemnity rule “is a practice of the bar that
worked for it and not a solution consciously chosen to meet ideals
of access to justice. The latter . . . is an after the fact
rationalization.”19 With each party having to bear the cost of their
attorney’s fees, there is little risk for plaintiffs to assert weak
claims in the hope of extracting a settlement from defendants who
know that defending such suits can be more costly than settling
even when they have a high probability of success at trial.20 The
American rule can also makes many, and some argue most, legal
victories Pyrrhic ones because unreimbursed legal fees can be
greater than the actual judgment a winning plaintiff obtains at
trial.21
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The results are even worse for defendants who when faced
with determined plaintiffs with weak or inflated claims have the
unsavory choice to either settle such claims or litigate them in
court where they will eventually prevail but be left to pay their
own lawyers’ fees in addition to the inconvenience and frustration
of having to litigate such claims. A notorious case in point is that
of a Washington D.C. plaintiff suing a dry cleaner for $67 million
for the loss of a pair of pants.22 The plaintiff, a Washington D.C.
administrative law judge, eventually reduced his suit to $54
million for pants lost by the dry cleaners; the ensuing litigation
which dragged on for more than two years and cost the defendants
in excess of $100,000 eventually led to their closing down the
business, even though fundraisers and local donations helped
defray most of the defendant’s litigation costs.23
Where is the justice for this defendant under the American
Rule? This is a result that could only happen in the United States
and the fact that it is rare must be of little consolation to the Chung
family who have no recourse in law after prevailing in court in a
case that clearly illustrates the potential for abuse made possible by
the American custom that each litigant should be responsible for
his/her own legal fees.24 Although an extreme example, the design
of the American system allows for many lesser unpublicized but
still significant obstacles to justice.
IV. CURRENT FEE SHIFTING IN THE UNITED STATES
Under our current system, court costs and attorney’s fees are
treated differently. The losing party pays all court costs with only
rare exceptions in federal courts for both trials and appeals.25 Costs
include modest witness fees, but do not generally include
compensation of expert witnesses.26 And attorney’s fees are
awarded only under exceptional circumstances such as when a
statute allows for reimbursement of legal fees or when a court
finds that a lawsuit was brought in bad faith. Since the 1970’s, the
number of federal statutes that allow for attorney’s fee awards
have increased dramatically.27 Since the first federal fee-shifting
statute in 1870 that required awarding attorneys’ fees to the
prevailing plaintiffs at trial in cases involving federal civil rights
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acts, the practice has become more common at the federal and state
levels.28 The number of statutes allowing the award of attorney’s
fees to prevailing plaintiffs increased from 30 in 1975 to
approximately 150 in 1983.29
A. Federal Examples of Loser Pays Rules
1. Federal Offer of Judgment Rules:
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains an
offer of judgment provision that was intended to clear the
congested federal dockets by promoting settlement and avoiding
protracted litigation.30 The drafters intended to allow defendants
who made an offer of judgment to a plaintiff to recover their postoffer costs when the plaintiff rejected the offer, proceeded to trial,
and prevailed, but received a judgment less favorable than the
offer.31 This rule provided the defendant with an incentive to make
a serious offer in order to invoke the effects of the rule and
plaintiffs were given an incentive to seriously consider accepting
the offer or risk penalties for choosing unwisely to continue
litigation after a settlement offer was made.32 However, only the
Eleventh and Fourth Circuits have interpreted Rule 68 to allow for
the reimbursement of both court costs and attorney’s fees incurred
by the prevailing party after a settlement offer is rejected if the
subsequent award is less than the settlement offer.33
2. The Equal Access to Justice Act:
Originally passed by Congress in 198034, the Equal Access to
Justice Act is intended to permit certain parties, particularly
individuals and small businesses,35 to challenge unreasonable
federal government actions, by allowing federal courts to award
attorney’s “fees and [other] expenses36 to certain prevailing parties
in certain actions involving the federal government37.
The Act’s two main provisions generally allow for recovery
of reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs in administrative
proceedings38 and civil lawsuits39, respectively. An award will be
made unless the adjudicating officer or court finds that the position
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of the United States was substantially justified, or that special
circumstances exist that would make such an award unjust40.
While the Act is “one sided” in that it permits only the nongovernment litigant the possibility of collecting by enforcing
“loser pays” against the government, like the numerous other
federal fee shifting rules, the Equal Access to Justice Act provides
at least some relief similar to that provided under the English Rule
B. States with Loser Pays Rules
Some states provide fee shifting or loser pays rules under
certain circumstances by statute. Although the circumstances under
which fee-shifting to the losing party can occur vary and, with the
exception of Alaska are quite modest, a brief overview of some of
these “loser pays” provisions may be instructive.
1.

Alaska:

The State of Alaska allows courts to compensate prevailing
parties for attorneys’ fees and authorizes the Alaska Supreme
Court to determine by rule or order the costs that may be awarded
in civil actions to prevailing parties.41 Courts are granted the
discretion to abate in whole or in part the awarding of attorneys’
fees in cases involving the United States Constitution or the
Constitution of the State of Alaska.42 Prevailing parties in civil
actions are generally entitled to receive an award for attorneys’
fees to parties awarded money judgments under the following
schedule:43
Judgment and, if
awarded, Prejudgment
Interest
First $ 25,000
Next $ 75,000
Next $400,000
Over $500,000

Contested
with Trial
20%
10%
10%
10%

Contested
without Trial
18%
8%
6%
2%

NonContested
10%
3%
2%
1%
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In a case in which the prevailing party recovers no money
judgment, the prevailing party is entitled to receive 30 percent of
reasonable actual attorney's fees which were necessarily incurred
if the case goes to trial, and 20 percent of its actual attorney's fees
which were necessarily incurred if the case is resolved without
going to trial.44 Courts are given the authority to vary the legal
fees awarded under the noted formula if they believe varying the
fees is warranted after weighing a variety of criteria enumerated in
the statute.45 Thus, judges are provided significant discretion to
raise or lower legal fees awarded under the statute to ensure that
they are equitable on a case by case basis.
2. California:
California provides limited “loser pays” provisions in cases
involving “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction
intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or
services to any consumer are unlawful.”46 Under California law,
consumers who prevail in an action arising out of an unfair method
of competition or deceptive business practice are entitled to
recover both court costs and attorney’s fees.47 Prevailing
defendants in such actions may also recover court costs and
reasonable attorney’s fees if a court finds that the plaintiff brought
the action in bad faith.48
California also allows partial attorney’s fees to be awarded
(capped at $75 per hour with discretion given the trial court to
raise the amount based on cost of living or limited availability of
counsel49) in cases brought by or against the state related to the
determination, collection, or refund of any tax, interest, or penalty
in any court of record in the state.50
An offer of judgment provision is also available under
California law that requires a plaintiff who rejects an offer of
judgment to pay the defendant’s post-offer court costs and postoffer attorney’s fees if the offer of judgment is rejected the
plaintiff subsequently obtains at trial a judgment that is less than
the defendant’s settlement offer.51
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3. Florida:
Florida adopted the English Rule for medical malpractice
cases in 1980 and required the losing party to pay all of the
prevailing party’s litigation expenses, including attorney’s fees,
but repealed the fee-shifting provisions five years later with
inconclusive results.52
Like California and several other states, Florida has an offer
of settlement provision that requires a plaintiff to pay a portion of
the defendant’s attorney’s fees if a court determines that a
settlement offer is rejected unreasonably.53 Under the Florida
statute, “[a]n offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably
rejected by a defendant if the judgment entered is at least 25
percent greater than the offer rejected, and an offer shall be
presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a plaintiff if the
judgment entered is at least 25 percent less than the offer
rejected.”54 Unreasonable rejection of a settlement offer will
require payment of the court costs, expenses and reasonable
attorney’s fees incurred by the other party after the settlement offer
was rejected.55
4. Illinois:
Under its Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act, Illinois allows a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees in
addition to court costs to the prevailing party in civil actions for
consumer fraud and deceptive business practices.56
5. New York:
As part of its consumer protection laws, New York allows a
court to assign reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing plaintiff
in civil actions involving deceptive business acts and practices.57
Attorney’s fees may also be awarded by a court to the prevailing
party, other than the state, for civil action brought against the state,
unless the court finds that the position of the state was
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substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award
unjust.58
6. Oklahoma:
Oklahoma makes the losing party in a wide range of civil
actions responsible for the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees
through separate statutory provisions. A sampling of these areas
include property line disputes;59 livestock liens;60 actions for
injunctive relief to prevent the unlawful use of a lender’s name,
trade name or trademark;61 actions to enforce visitation
agreements;62 actions for labor or services rendered or on certain
accounts, bills and contracts;63 and actions involving the
unauthorized use of a deceased personality’s right of publicity64
among many others.
7. Oregon:
Oregon allows for a court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees
to a prevailing plaintiff in certain small claims in tort where the
amount in controversy does not exceed $7,500 if a demand for
payment was made at least 30 days prior to the commencement of
the action by the plaintiff of the defendant or the defendant’s
insurance company.65 No attorneys’ fees may be awarded,
however, if a settlement offer was made by the defendant before
the action was commenced that is the same or more than the final
judgment obtained in court.66 Defendants may also be awarded
reasonable attorneys’ fees for successful counterclaims for
amounts of $7,500 or less.67
Reasonable attorneys’ fees may also be awarded a prevailing
plaintiff In any action for damages for breach of an express or
implied warranty in a sale of consumer goods or services where
the amount pleaded is $ 2,500 or less if the court finds that written
demand for the payment of such claim was made on the defendant
not less than 30 days before commencement of the action and that
the defendant was allowed within that 30 days reasonable
opportunity to inspect any property pertaining to the claim.
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However, attorneys’ fees are not available if the defendant
tendered a settlement offer to the plaintiff, prior to the
commencement of the action of an amount not less than the
damages awarded to the plaintiff at trial.68 Prevailing defendants
may also be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees if the action is
found to have been frivolous.69
Oregon also allows the award of reasonable attorney’s fees to
prevailing plaintiffs (and prevailing defendants if the action is
deemed to be frivolous) in cases involving unlawful discrimination
in both court and administrative proceedings;70 in actions for
intimidation;71 in actions for trade discrimination;72 and in civil
actions for involuntary servitude or trafficking in persons. 73
Oregon also provides for the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to
prevailing plaintiffs in a range of other actions, including: the
award of liquidated damages to sports official subjected to
offensive physical contact;74 the sale or successful solicitation of
sale of securities in violation of Oregon Securities Law;75 injury to
or removal of produce, trees or shrubs;76 discrimination in renting
housing because of assistance animal (attorneys’ fees may be
awarded to the prevailing plaintiff or to the prevailing defendant if
the plaintiff’s case is determined to be frivolous);77 in actions by
employees to collect wages not paid within 48 hours (excluding
weekends) of the time they become due;78 unlawful discrimination
in employment, public accommodations and real property
transactions (attorney fees awardable to the prevailing party); 79
actions to recover on insurance policies or contractor’s bond
unpaid within six months where settlement is not made within six
months of proof of loss (defendants may recover a reasonable
amount towards their attorneys’ fees if a settlement offer rejected
by a plaintiff is the same or larger than the ultimate judgment
obtained at trial);80 and, among others, unlawful trade practices
(prevailing defendants may also be awarded attorneys’ fees when a
court finds the plaintiff’s case to be frivolous).81
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8. Texas:
Texas imposes an offer of settlement system that can make
parties who reject an offer liable for a portion of the prevailing
party’s attorneys’ fees under certain circumstances. The offer of
settlement under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure82 Rule 167 must
be invoked by the defendant by filing a declaration invoking the
rule within 45 days of the case being set for trial. 83 Once invoked,
Rule 167 provides that if an offer is rejected and the judgment
entered is significantly less favorable than the settlement offer,
then the prevailing party whose offer was rejected is entitled to be
reimbursed for the litigation costs incurred after the offer was
made.84 A judgment award on monetary claims is defined as
significantly less favorable than an offer to settle those claims if
the offeree is a claimant and the judgment would be less than 80
percent of the offer, or if the offeree is a defendant and the
judgment would be more than 120 percent of the offer.85 Litigation
costs are defined to include court costs, reasonable fees for not
more than two testifying expert witnesses, and reasonable attorney
fees.86 The litigation costs that may be awarded under the rule
cannot exceed the sum of the noneconomic damages, the
exemplary or additional damages, and one-half of the economic
damages to be awarded to the claimant in the judgment minus the
amount of any statutory or contractual liens in connection with the
occurrences or incidents giving rise to the claim.87 In addition, the
rule does not apply to a class action, a shareholder's derivative
action, an action by or against the State, a unit of state government,
or a political subdivision of the State, an action brought under the
Family Code, an action to collect workers' compensation benefits
under title 5, subtitle A of the Labor Code, or an action filed in a
justice of the peace court or small claims court.88
V. WHAT IS THE LIKELY IMPACT OF ADOPTING THE
WORLD RULE OVER THE AMERICAN RULE?
In sum, the oft cited argument in defense of the American
Rule is that loser pays systems will have a chilling effect on
plaintiffs’ willingness to assert their lawful claims in court for fear
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of having to pay the defendant’s costs if they do not prevail in
court. 89 This position is combined with the fear that requiring
payment of the prevailing party’s legal fees can have a chilling
effect on individuals of limited means asserting valid claims in
court for fear of losing and having to bear not only their own legal
expenses, but also those of the winning party.90 Critics of the
American Rule counter that having to pay for one’s own legal
expenses can also prevent plaintiffs with limited means from using
the courts to settle valid claims and provides an advantage to
litigants with superior resources.91 These critics also note that it
fails to fully compensate successful plaintiffs for their losses since
they must unjustly pay their lawyers to receive that to which they
are legally entitled to.92
In fact there is little disincentive for individuals under the
American System to refrain from pursuing cases with little merit in
the courts for their nuisance value since settling such cases can be
far less costly for defendants regardless of their merit. Although
current data on national and regional average hourly rates charged
by lawyers is hard to come by, one recent survey of 250 national
firms found the average rate charged by these firms to be $372 per
hour.93 Legal advice is expensive, and litigation more so. It is
generally accepted that only 2-3 percent of civil cases in the
United States proceed to a verdict;94 the rest are settled or
abandoned before a judgment is entered.95
Although reliable statistics are not available on the number of
civil cases settled in the United States every year, most
commentators often cite settlement figures of 90% or more.96 The
high cost of litigation no doubt encourages settlement of cases
under the American Rule, especially those of relatively low value
as the cost of defending against these in the courts can be high.
Indeed, it is not unusual for the combined legal bills of litigants to
equal or exceed the amounts in controversy in litigated cases. 97 It
is understandable, then, that many defendants faced with the
unsavory choice of settling a low-merit claim or paying a
significantly higher amount in attorneys’ fees to defend in court
will often choose expediency over justice and settle a weak claim.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is not possible to predict with certainty the effect of
adopting a “loser pays” system in the United States. Replacing the
American Rule with the World Rule would likely reduce the
number of claims with questionable merit as plaintiffs faced with
the prospect of having to pay the defendant’s legal fees should
they not prevail in court would be less likely to bring such cases in
the first instance. Likewise, it stands to reason that fewer
questionable claims would be settled by defendants unburdened by
having to pay their own legal costs in cases when they are likely to
prevail in court. But even if this were not the case, there is still a
compelling reason to abandon the American Rule: Fundamental
fairness. In bringing legal action, a plaintiff subjects a defendant to
legal costs and significant inconvenience that a defendant can only
avoid by capitulating to the plaintiff’s claims. The American Rule
requires each party, regardless of the merits of their case, to bear
their own legal expense simply because it is the established
practice that they should do so. This practice can victimize both
virtuous plaintiffs and defendants by requiring them to bear the
cost of prevailing in court while at the same time rewarding
unreasonable plaintiffs and defendants by allowing them to use the
cost of litigation as leverage to exact advantageous settlements to
which they have little legal claim.
Valid concerns about preserving access to justice can be
addressed within the context of a loser pays system in various
ways. Both the federal government and states could follow
Alaska’s lead and adopt a system that awards attorneys’ fees based
on a sliding scale as a percentage of judgments obtained at trial.
Exceptions can be carved out awarding attorneys’ fees to
prevailing parties, such as in matters relating to family law, civil
rights, or class actions. Courts can also be given the right to refuse
claims for attorneys’ fees for compelling reasons under their equity
powers when justice requires it.
While American exceptionalism may justify standing in
opposition to the rest of the world when there is just cause, the
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American Rule seems to offer little more by way of compelling
justification in the final analysis than a custom and tradition whose
only clear beneficiaries are the lawyers who thrive in a country
with the dubious distinction of being universally acknowledged as
the most litigious nation on earth.
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